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In his “Postscript on Control Societies,” Deleuze notably refers to a “mutation of capital-
ism” as one of the key characteristics of the post-disciplinary regime he terms control 
society. “The operation of markets,” he writes, “is now the instrument of social control 
and forms the impudent breed of our masters” (1992: 6). In the following essay, I will 
focus on a section of the economy in which this mutation is especially visible: the realm 
of finance, which in recent years has assumed an increasingly political and governmental 
function. 
 This development should concern us – if we are not indifferent to how we are gov-
erned now and in the future. Indeed, we have reached a critical point where it will be 
decided whether current democracies will turn into ‘demonocracies.’ I am not just refer-
ring to such boisterous attempts that link the dismantling of the constitutional state with 
the mobilization of nationalist or ethnic resentment. Rather, we are in a situation in 
which the financial regime has taken on the character of a ‘fourth power’ and in which 
the formation of a power of capital (Kapitalmacht) is directly linked to the operations of 
capitals of power (Machtkapitalien). Insofar as crises represent intellectual strokes of 
luck driving forces out of their latency that remain inconspicuous under normal condi-
tions, the last financial and economic crisis provided an appropriate diagram: here one 
could observe a style of government that deserves the title of a subtle coup d’état.  
 This means two things. On the one hand, from 2008 to the current euro policy, we 
are dealing with decision-making entities made up of government representatives, in-
ternational organizations, and private companies (major banks, rating agencies) that 
have come together in informal bodies, represent the interests of creditors, and operate 
outside legal ties.2 A particular example was provided by the so-called Eurogroup, which 
directly dictates the fate of European debtor countries. When asked on what legal basis 
decisions are to be enforced against the opposition of individual members, the chair of 
the Eurogroup replied very straightforwardly: “The Eurogroup does not exist in Europe-
                                                        
1 The following essay is based on a podcast that was recorded for the Wiener Festwochen 2018 as part of 
the series “Pod Save Austria.” 
2 For more on this, see my book The Ascendancy of Finance (Vogl 2017). 
  
 
Coils of the Serpent 6 (2020): 55-60 
 
56 Vogl: The Financial Regime 
an law. It is an informal group and, therefore, there are no written rules to constrain its 
President.” (Varoufakis 2015)  
 On the other hand, measures were taken that manifested themselves as quasi-
sovereign actions. With the Eurogroup, but also with the European Stability Mechanism 
or the Fiscal Compact, legislative procedures were circumvented and a legally non-
formalized secondary structure was created, which functions as a transnational execu-
tive authority: with the suspension of budgetary rights, with interventions in tax law, 
social policy, labor law, etc. The effects are well known: In Greece, for example, economic 
output collapsed by 28%, unemployment rose to 27%, youth unemployment to 65%, 
and average wages fell by almost a quarter. 
 What happened here? How could this ostentatious alliance between finance capital 
and government come about? How did this fusion of informal consortia, sovereign pow-
ers, and transnational executive authority take place? And what are the components of 
which the current financial regime is made up?  
 Initially, it was formed as part of a process called, for quite some time now, ‘finan-
cialization.’ The beginnings go back to the 1970s and are characterized by a confluence 
of different events and measures. A first condition was the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system (in the early 1970s), which led to “floating rates of exchange” (Deleuze 
1992: 5), new financial instruments (such as currency derivatives), and expanding fi-
nancial markets. Then came the so-called ‘Volcker shock,’ when the Federal Reserve 
(under Paul Volcker) drastically raised its benchmark interest rate in order to divert the 
profits of surplus countries (like Japan or Germany) to Wall Street, while simultaneously 
forcing down labor costs. This was supplemented by the (neo-)liberal economic reforms 
under Thatcher and Reagan – with the deregulation of financial markets, tax privileges 
for interest-bearing assets, and the privatization of social security systems. Next to other 
interventions that enabled financial capital to break out of its welfare state containment 
(e.g. the reduction of corporate taxes, the reform of labor markets, or the passing of Fi-
nancial Market Promotion Laws), two further components were added. 
 On the one hand, a new and dominant role of international organizations and 
agreements in the realm of finance – perhaps most evident in the role of the IMF. Since 
the 1970s, it has been given a special assignment, namely, to monitor compliance with 
‘stability criteria’ in the face of floating exchange rates. Now the great era of ‘structural 
adjustment programs’ began: the granting of loans to developing and emerging nations 
under strict requirements – including budgetary discipline, tax reforms, privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, protection of investors, the liberalization of the capital market, 
and the facilitation of foreign investments.  
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 On the other hand, a reorientation of central banks was pushed, something which is 
best illustrated by the establishment of the ECB: It sees itself as the guarantor of the fi-
nancial and monetary system, functions as service provider for banks and financial mar-
kets, operates as an independent governmental enclave, and is impervious to other or-
gans of government. Hence, it is characterized by a one-sided orientation: While it is not 
accountable to European parliaments and governments, its responsibility is to the finan-
cial community. In order to secure currency and monetary value, it is committed to 
those investors and players who dictate the dynamics of the financial markets. In other 
words, the ECB provides a kind of ‘minority protection’ for the representatives of fi-
nance. Through central banks, then, financial markets have become an integral part of 
government practice and manifest themselves as para-democratic political agents.  
 This certainly does not cover all the elements of the current financial regime (for 
instance, one must not forget electronic commerce, shadow banking, or the dominant 
economic doctrines). But it does of course raise the question: What can we expect from 
all this? What can we hope for? Or more precisely: Of what must we despair? What are 
“the new forces knocking at the door”? (Deleuze 1992: 4)  
 First, when we speak of financial economics today, we do not refer to an economic 
state of affairs or to a special market system. Rather, the current financial regime is a 
conglomerate of state organs, central banks, international organizations, treaties, and 
privileged private companies, an ensemble of public, semi-private, and private actors. 
One should not speak of free markets here, but of a ‘regulatory capitalism.’ With its own 
transnational legal power, it has gained the status of a global executive authority, which 
directly intervenes in national economies and the government policies of the old nation 
states. As a special form of power, the financial regime structures a transnational space 
in which sovereign authorities, business, and market mechanisms merge. Thus, we wit-
ness the transition from a geo-political to a geo-economic order, in which accumulation 
and exploitation zones are distributed differently and a new class antagonism is estab-
lished: a confrontation between mobile groups of investors or supercitizens, on the one 
hand, and the more earthbound citizens or subcitizens, on the other.  
 Second, major turning points in the history of the financial regime are not marked 
by the ‘resounding’ events of the recent crises. Rather, the historical rupture took place 
in the 1980s, which saw a reversal of long-term trends. Until then, progressive taxes, 
social security systems, and strong trade unions had ensured a continuous reduction of 
inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. The processes of financialization 
have inverted this dynamic and have led to a situation in which a peak in private wealth 
stands in stark contrast to a record level of private (and public) debt, with both – assets 
and debts – being increasingly unequally distributed (I will spare you the well-known 
data; see, for example, Piketty 2014). Two moments are particularly noteworthy. On the 
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one hand, since the 1990s an increasing proportion of profits and credit has been in-
vested in financial products; this has initiated an aggressive deindustrialization driven 
by the financial economy (especially in the US and in the UK) which is continued in to-
day’s ‘platform capitalism’ (see Srnicek 2017), whose high profits and stock market val-
ues are due to policies that released companies from their responsibilities to fixed capi-
tal and labor. On the other hand, the financial regime thus functions as a bottom to top 
transfer system which turns the lower half of the population into net interest payers for 
the owners of financial assets. This has been accompanied by the passive inclusion of 
wage earners into the financial economy: through the expansion of consumer credit and 
mortgages, through pension funds supported by the financial market, and through the 
privatization of health and retirement provisions. The upward redistribution of interest 
payments corresponds to a downward redistribution of financial risks. One result could 
be observed in the wake of the euro crisis: The weakest countries and groups bore the 
costs of the crisis – a kind of internal colonization of European populations was orga-
nized. The dynamics of the financial regime thus not only unleashed political and eco-
nomic centrifugal forces in Europe (a process that is open-ended), but also attacked one 
of the most important resources of democratic politics and led to an overall erosion of 
solidarity.  
 Third, this is linked to a problem that is already intensely examined by economists: 
namely, the migration of the liquidity monopoly from governments and central banks to 
the financial markets. We are dealing with the transition from a ‘government-driven’ to a 
‘market-driven’ financial system, which has become detached from the central 
bank/commercial banks axis. This in turn has two consequences. On the one hand, cen-
tral banks have lost the overview of systemic risks, but also the control over circulating 
money supplies. Money creation takes place in the markets, recent financial instruments 
have erased the difference between money and financial assets, and the idea of a definite 
and determinable quantity of money must now appear as a historical curiosity. The 
structural instability of financial markets is complemented by the waning of control 
mechanisms. On the other hand, financial markets have become a ‘prison’ for govern-
ments, national economies, and societies. This is particularly evident in the policy of the 
ECB, which is bound to a ‘blocking rule’ for the purchase of bonds of the European mem-
ber states; also, an enrichment automatism was installed: The ECB provides private 
banks with cheap money, which the latter lend more profitably for public finance, while 
conversely buying public debt previously purchased by private banks. The independent 
central bank has financed the dependence of public budgets on the financial sector; and 
with the threat of capital flight, interest rate penalties, and a decrease of investments, 
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 Fourth, a double dilemma has arisen from this. According to prevailing dogma, eco-
nomic growth is financed by low interest rates and cheap money (as has been attempted 
for a decade). However, this is precisely what leads to the accumulation of future risks: 
Investments flow less into industry, infrastructure, or labor, but rather seek out capital 
and real estate markets. The symptoms are already apparent: from the stock market 
boom of recent years to the devastation of the inner cities due to exploding property 
prices. The attempt to generate economic growth is thus simultaneously financing the 
next financial crisis. This is accompanied by the shadow of a political dilemma. The de-
politicization of monetary policy, which has migrated from central banks to financial 
markets, went hand in hand with a political privileging of the financial industry, which, 
via money creation and financing structures, can decide major distribution issues for 
itself. Political decisions are thus dictated by the anticipation of market preferences; and 
the interests of a voting public are limited by the moods of an investing financial public. 
This, if you will, is a class struggle waged by the agents of finance against the rest of the 
population.  
 Inevitably, older issues of sovereignty thus reappear. Even if one must accept a 
global situation in which sovereign authority can today only be exercised in a limited, 
disseminated and fragmented way, some questions remain (with which I will conclude). 
In such a situation, one should first of all beware of false friends offering answers to 
questions they are unable to ask. A case in point is liberalism, which, by referring to the 
blessings of the market system, consistently ignores the concrete power structure of the 
financial regime. The other false hope is placed on the old nation state. For besides the 
fact that this entity has played a major role in the creation of the current financial order, 
it is already in the process of forming what is perhaps the most aggressive alliance, as is 
currently being tested in the US: the alliance between the financial industry and pluto-
cratic lobbies with a policy of nationalist resentment.3 
 How, then, can the financial regime’s consistent deformation of democratic princi-
ples be stopped? On the one hand, after 2008 – and for a moment – the prospects in Eu-
rope looked good: Major banks had voluntarily socialized themselves, solidarity move-
ments arose, and sound proposals piled up that addressed the long overdue coordina-
tion between monetary, fiscal, and economic policy. But all that is long gone; most re-
cently, the separate banking system (the necessary separation between commercial and 
investment banks) demanded by all experts has died. On the other hand, the financial 
regime has asserted itself as a superior power combining the private creation of value 
with the use of the instruments of a sovereign authority in an even more efficient man-
ner. Therefore, our pessimism today cannot be great enough. And this means: it is a 
question of sharpening a pessimistic realism that distrusts attempts at appeasement, 
                                                        
3 In his Postscript, Deleuze seems to predict this trend: “It may be that older methods, borrowed from the 
former societies of sovereignty, will return to the fore, but with the necessary modifications.” (1992: 7) 
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refuses to consider financial capitalism to be the best of all worlds, and renders the 
power of the financial regime as so illegitimate and unacceptable that it becomes the 
target of interventions, disputes, and struggles: This is not how one wants to be gov-
erned.  
 For in the financial regime the following applies: Sovereign is he who is able to turn 
his own risks into dangers for others and manifests himself as a creditor of last resort. 
Or with a quote from Samuel Beckett: “To him who has nothing it is forbidden not to 
relish filth.” (2009: 19-20) 
translated from German by Simon Schleusener and Florian Cord  
 
Works Cited 
Beckett, Samuel (2009). Three Novels: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable. New York: 
Grove Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles (1992). “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” October 59: 3-7. 
Piketty, Thomas (2014): Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge and London: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Srnicek, Nick (2017). Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Varoufakis, Yanis (2015). “The Defeat of Europe.” transform! europe. 13 Aug. 
<https://www.transform-network.net/de/fokus/overview/detail/greece-
decides-2015/the-defeat-of-europe/>. [accessed 29 Sep. 2020] 
Vogl, Joseph (2017). The Ascendancy of Finance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
